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A Bigger Piece of the Pie? State Corrections Spending and the Politics of Social Order  
 
 The dramatic increase in American state prison populations over the last three decades has 
sparked considerable research interest.  Empirical research has most often examined changes in 
prison admissions or populations.  Few studies, however, have considered another important 
indicator of punishment—shifts over time in state corrections budgets.  This study examines 
variation in annual, state-level corrections expenditures as a proportion of state total expenditures 
from 1980 to 1998. We draw together existing theoretical arguments about criminal punishment 
under a common rubric that we call a “politics of social order perspective” which focuses on state 
responsibility for the maintenance of social order and the need for state officials to maintain office 
through popular election.  From this view, partisan politics, economic and racial threat, citizen 
preferences, fiscal considerations, policy priorities, and crime are important explanations of 
corrections spending because they affect strategies for maintaining social order, garnering votes and 
maintaining political office.  Our findings generally support this perspective.  Specifically, partisan 
politics, racial threat, state economic prosperity, and budgetary priorities all play a role in 
determining the proportion of state expenditures devoted to corrections over time.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 The dramatic increase in imprisonment in the United States is now well-documented.  
Between 1980 and 1999, rates of imprisonment more than tripled from approximately 140 to 476 
prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents between 1980 and 1999 (Blumstein 2002:452).  Corrections 
budgets also rose dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.  Adjusting for inflation, corrections spending 
in the United States increased by 350% from 1980 to 1999 (adapted from Maguire and Pastore 2002: 
Table 1.2).  As a proportion of total state expenditures, corrections spending nearly doubled during 
this period, increasing from 1.6 to more than 3 percent on average.     
 The “prison boom” of the late 20th century has spawned a number of recent empirical studies 
(e.g. Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Jacobs and Helms 1996, 2001; 
Michalowski and Carlson 1999, 2000; Smith 2004; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang 2005).  Although early 
research on punishment focused primarily on economic explanations (see Chiricos and Delone 1992 
for a review), more recent research has focused on political explanations, generally focusing on 
prison populations rather than corrections expenditures. Yet as Jacobs and Helms (1999) argue, 
corrections expenditures are under more direct political control than the dependent measures 
typically used in punishment research – admissions and custody rates.  Indeed, Caldeira and Cowart 
(1980:422) argue that the budget is “one of the most important mechanisms through which 
governments can seek to achieve policy goals of all sorts.”  Thus, we can learn much about states’ 
responses to crime by examining their spending on corrections.1  
 To date, however, very few studies have examined corrections spending and most are dated 
and limited methodologically.  One exception is a recent national-level study by Jacobs and Helms 
(1999) which examines the factors affecting variation in corrections expenditures from 1954 to 1990.  
1 Taggart (1989a) notes that corrections expenditures are a good outcome to consider the effects of 
partisan politics on state spending because there are fewer autonomous programs engaged in resource 
competition than in arenas such as education, where K-12 and higher education compete for money 
(see also Taggart 1997).   
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Yet, national-level analyses are unable to address state-level corrections spending.  This is an issue 
because: a) most inmates, probationers, and parolees are under state supervision, and state budgets 
for corrections are almost exclusively administered by the states; and b) there is great variability in 
spending within and across states over time, as illustrated in Figure 1.  The figure shows corrections 
spending as a proportion of all state expenditures for selected states and the national average from 
1980 to 1998.  Although the national average steadily increased over the period, the timing and 
pattern of increases, and in some cases decreases, varied substantially across states.  Ignoring this 
variability can be a source of aggregation bias in national-level studies.   
Figure 1 about here 
  
 In the next section we describe extant studies of corrections spending that point to the 
importance of partisan politics.  Next, we draw together research on criminal punishment and 
research on state spending and public policy under a common rubric that we call a “politics of social 
order” perspective. This perspective draws insights from recent research on punishment (e.g. Beckett 
and Western 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1999) and suggests that 
variation in punishment will be driven by two concerns of modern, democratic states—social order 
and electoral politics.  
EXTANT RESEARCH ON CORRECTIONS SPENDING  
 Despite the tremendous increase in corrections spending over the last 30 years, very few 
studies have examined this phenomenon.2  Although there are few studies and most are now dated, 
they offer insights for the current study, particularly with respect to the role of partisan politics.   
  Several of these studies are at the national-level.  In one early study, Caldeira and Cowart 
(1980) found that changes in the crime rate explained changes in the federal budget devoted to 
criminal justice agencies (including corrections) from 1935 to 1975, and expenditure increases were 
2 The dearth of research on corrections expenditures is surprising given the attention to spending on 
other public policies, such as welfare provisions (e.g. Barrilleaux, et al. 2002; Dye 1984). 
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more likely under Republican Presidents.  They also found that Republican Presidents were more 
likely to respond to increasing crime by increasing expenditures.  Similarly, Caldeira (1983) argued 
that Presidents facing elections may increase criminal justice expenditures to take advantage of 
public fear of crime and garner votes.  He found that Presidents were more likely to request higher 
criminal justice expenditures in election years irrespective of crime rates.  These studies point to the 
role of politics for criminal justice expenditures but do not address other potentially important 
explanations.  In addition, they examine total criminal justice expenditures rather than spending 
specific to corrections.   
 The only national-level research to focus exclusively on corrections expenditures is a recent 
study by Jacobs and Helms (1999), who examined per capita funding for corrections (federal, state 
and local combined) from 1954 to 1990.  They reported that spending increased with the size of the 
nonwhite population, number of riots, crime rates, and previous (lagged 20 years) births out of 
wedlock.3  In addition, they found that the strength of the Republican Party was associated with 
increases in corrections expenditures.  Thus, one recent national-level study of corrections 
expenditures highlights the role of partisan politics, racial threat and crime.  The question is whether 
state-level studies would reveal similar findings.   
 However, we could locate only two published state-level studies.  The first, by Taggart 
(1989a), reported separate time series models for each of the 48 contiguous states for the period 1945 
to 1984.  This study found that correctional spending was explained by the state’s total revenue base 
and overall state expenditures.  Yet, this study did not include any variables one might use to 
evaluate political or threat explanations.  In a second study, Taggart and Winn (1991) reported a 
cross-sectional analysis of corrections expenditures in the lower 48 states in 1984, finding that higher 
3 We do not have annual state-level data on civil unrest for the period of the current study.  Therefore, 
we cannot assess Jacobs and Helms’ argument that riots are associated with corrections spending.  
Yet, unlike much of the period of their study, urban rioting was rare during the years of our study. 
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crime rates and percentages of non-white males were related to increased corrections spending; 
however, partisan political control was unrelated to spending.  Both studies are dated, with 1984 
being the last year studied.  As a consequence, neither could take advantage of recent statistical 
developments and thus, are limited methodologically by today’s standards.  The first study conducted 
a separate time-series analysis for each state (rather than using a pooled model), which could have 
reduced the efficiency of the estimation.  The second study relied on cross-sectional data, raising 
concerns over causal ordering and statistical power due to the small sample size (n=48). 4   
 Our study goes beyond previous research on correctional spending by using more appropriate 
data and methods.  We include data from 1980 through 1998 and thus speak to correctional spending 
through most of the 1990s, an important chunk of the prison boom period that has not been studied in 
previous research on spending.  
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 Because punishment, including spending on corrections, is inherently an exercise of state 
power (see Foucault 1977; Garland 1990, 1991), theoretical explanations of spending on criminal 
punishment must examine the role of the state.  In this section, we show how existing arguments 
about criminal punishment can be recast in terms of a ‘politics of social order’ framework.  Viewing 
existing approaches to criminal punishment from the politics of order perspective further clarifies the 
role of partisan politics as well as the potential connections between partisan politics and economic 
and racial threat.  Existing research has treated political and non-political factors as more or less 
separate influences on punishment outcomes, without providing an underlying logic tying them 
together.   
4 A few studies have also examined the impact of federal court decisions regarding prison reforms on 
corrections spending (e.g. Fliter 1996; Taggart 1989b).  These studies suggest that, court orders 
increased some types of corrections spending in some states and but this effect declined in the 1980s 
as the courts limited the scope of prison reforms.    
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 We argue that the connection lies in the basic concerns of modern governments.  Punishment, 
as an exercise of state power, is motivated by two overriding concerns.  First, as has long been 
recognized, one of the basic functions of states is to guarantee social order (for a discussion see 
Jacobs and Carmichael 2001: 61-62).  Second, in democratic societies, elected officials must 
constantly engage in the calculus of reelection.  Thus, all potential courses of action by state 
managers are considered through the lens of electoral politics because, unlike in authoritarian 
regimes, elected officials must satisfy voters to retain power.   From this view, existing explanations 
of criminal punishment and state policies more generally – including partisan politics, citizen 
ideology, economic and racial threat, alternative policy priorities, fiscal realities, and crime control – 
are expected to be related to variation in punishment because they influence the maintenance of 
social order and/or the calculus of reelection.  
Such a perspective assumes that the state is relatively (but not completely) autonomous.  
Thus, state managers are expected to respond to environmental cues in dealing with the twin 
concerns of maintaining social order and reelection, but they are not completely driven by them.  
This position represents a middle ground between neo-Marxian accounts that view the state as driven 
by capitalist interests and statist approaches that focus on the parochial concerns of state managers, 
such as reelection (see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1984).  The advantage of such an 
approach is that it makes sense of the somewhat disparate explanations offered by recent empirical 
research on punishment and public policy.  In the remainder of this section we discuss prior 
explanations of punishment and public policy, in light of this politics of social order rubric. 
Partisan Politics 
A growing body of research suggests that partisan political considerations are likely to drive 
variations in criminal punishment.  For example, studies of corrections spending at the national level 
(Caldeira 1983; Caldeira and Cowart 1980; Jacobs and Helms 1999) and studies of state level 
imprisonment trends both emphasize the importance of Republican power (e.g. Jacobs and 
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Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1999; Beckett 1997; Stucky, et al. 2005).  We argue that 
the relationship between politics and criminal punishment derives from the need for state managers 
to maintain power through popular election.   
Prior research in political science suggests that partisan politics shape policy and spending 
through party control or party competition.  Partisan control of government is expected to influence 
public policy because different parties exhibit different policy priorities.  Therefore, one would 
expect to see differences in punishment practices based on the ideological preferences of the parties 
in power. The Republican Party has long been considered the “law and order” party and thus can be 
expected to increase crime control efforts (Jacobs and Helms 1996; Beckett 1997).  Jacobs and 
Carmichael (2001) suggest that this law and order approach is calculated to increase votes among 
less affluent voters—who otherwise would be unlikely to vote for conservative candidates—by 
appealing to their fear of crime (see also Beckett 1997).  Thus, partisan differences in criminal 
punishment are expected to be driven by the strategic choices of elected officials to improve the 
chances of election or reelection, consistent with the logic of the politics of social order.5  
Others argue that competition between parties drives state policies rather than party control 
(see Key 1949).  According to this view, in states where there is a balance of seats, legislators must 
be mindful of blocs of potential voters that could shift the balance of power in the legislature.  Hence, 
legislatures are expected to be more responsive to minority groups when there is a slim majority of 
seats.  The majority party will court these groups to retain control, whereas the minority party would 
court these groups in hopes of gaining control of the legislature.  Here again, the logic of the party 
5 Most research on the impact of partisan politics on state spending has focused on welfare 
expenditures.  Because the poor are more likely to be Democratic, some argue the welfare 
expenditures should be higher in Democratically-controlled states (Key 1949, Barrilleaux, et al. 
2002).  Empirical support for this hypothesis is mixed (cf.  Lewis-Beck 1977; Marquette and 
Hinckley 1981; Winters 1976).  
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competition model is consistent with a politics of social order perspective which suggests that public 
policy is driven partly by the calculus of electoral politics.    
The competition thesis has been most often examined relative to state welfare spending and 
suggests that expenditures will be higher in relatively balanced states where legislators of both 
parties must be mindful of the potential swing vote of the poor.  The evidence in favor of a party 
competition model is mixed (cf. Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966, 1984; Sharkansky and 
Hofferbert 1969).  Consequently, several recent researchers have suggested that statewide party 
competition may be less important for state policies than district-level party competition (e.g. 
Barrilleaux 1997; Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).  Thus, 
public policy outcomes may be shaped more by the prospect of competition on election-day than the 
relative number of seats in the legislature.  Consistent with this, Barrilleaux (1997) finds that states 
with closer district electoral competition have more liberal policies, independent of party strength in 
the state.  Thus, district competition exerts a direct effect on state policy liberalism because 
legislators of both parties are cognizant of the swing vote of the poor.  One might also expect that 
corrections spending would be lower in states with higher competition because more money might be 
directed at welfare spending.  Regardless of whether competition is expected to operate at the macro 
or micro-level, it is consistent with the idea that state policies are driven (at least partly) by strategic 
choices of state officials to maximize the chances of maintaining power through election.  To date, 
no studies have considered whether correctional spending is influenced by state or district-level 
political competition. However, Stucky, et al. (2005) reported that the effect of Republican strength 
in state legislatures on prison admissions was conditional on the relative degree of district 
competition, with the proportion of Republicans in the legislature having a trivial effect when 
competition was low and a significant effect when competition reached higher levels.   
Another potential political influence on corrections spending is the racial composition of state 
elected officials.  Research has shown that the race of officials can have an impact on other public 
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policies (e.g. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Karnig and Welch 1980).  Black elected officials 
may influence corrections policies in two ways.  They may be more likely to vote against increasing 
corrections expenditures in favor of other social programs, either because they are more likely to be 
politically liberal or because of the disparate impact of additional corrections expenditures on their 
constituents.  This has not yet been examined with regard to corrections spending. 
In sum, existing research points to the influence of partisan control or competition on public 
policy, including criminal punishment and corrections spending, because state officials are expected 
to shape policies so as to maximize their chances of maintaining power through elections.  Such 
arguments fit well with the logic of the politics of social order perspective, which suggests that state 
action will be driven by concerns over social order or the maintenance of power through popular 
elections.     
Conservative Preferences of Citizens 
 Others argue that politicians’ support for public policies reflects the preferences of their 
constituents (see Burstein 1998, 2003; Erikson, Wright and McIver 1989 with regard to other public 
policies). In a sense, the job of the politician is to say what the voters want to hear. Expansions in 
corrections spending therefore could be the result of pressure from conservative groups clamoring for 
harsher punishments in response to perceived increases in crime.  This line of reasoning fits nicely 
with the politics of social order perspective.  From this view, state officials of either party are apt to 
increase punishment if they believe that the best road to re-election lies with satisfying the desires of 
voters for harsher punishment.  Indeed, Beckett and Sasson (2000) and Greenberg and West (2001) 
argue that partisan differences on punishment have declined in recent years as politicians of both 
parties tried to take advantage of conservative sentiments by being perceived as tough on crime.  
 It follows then that citizen ideology may have an effect on criminal punishment independent 
of the effects of partisan politics.   Consistent with this, Jacobs and Helms (2001) used a measure of 
citizen ideology developed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and found that, on 
 9 
average, states with more conservative citizens had higher incarceration rates.  Similarly, Greenberg 
and West (2001) report an effect on state-level incarceration of an alternative measure of citizen 
ideology, developed by Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985).   
Economic and Racial Threat     
 The perspective we outlined above suggests that one major driver of public policy is the 
responsibility of states to maintain public order.  Economic and racial threat arguments also suggest 
that state policies on punishment are driven by this concern.  Research on imprisonment trends has 
long argued that fluctuations in punishment should coincide with business cycles and, more 
specifically level of labor market participation (see for review Chiricos and Delone 1992).  The 
theoretical underpinnings of this research derive from Rusche and Kirschheimer’s ([1939]1968) 
seminal political economy argument that labor surplus drives up criminal punishment as the state 
seeks to control potentially dangerous marginal populations who could threaten public order.  Thus, 
states are expected to increase punishment at times when increases in the size of “idle” populations 
could threaten elite interests and the status quo.  Such arguments comport well with the politics of 
social order perspective, which suggests that state actors will respond to elite perception of threats to 
social order by increasing criminal punishment.  Thus, changes in the size of potentially threatening 
populations of idle workers are expected to increase the perceived threat to elite interests. This leads 
state managers to increase corrections expenditures in an attempt to garner votes by fostering the 
perception that they are working to maintain order. 
 Although there has been substantial research on the relationship between labor surplus and 
punishment, findings have been mixed (see Chiricos and Delone 1992 for review; also compare 
Jacobs and Carmichael 2001, Greenberg and West 2001, and Stucky, et al. 2005 for more recent 
evidence).  The inconsistency in these findings may stem partly from the fact that most research has 
used official unemployment figures as an indicator of labor surplus.  These “official” unemployment 
figures are based on the civilian labor force, which excludes “discouraged workers” who have 
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stopped looking for work (see Chiricos and Delone 1992:431-432).  The empirical association 
between official unemployment figures and labor surplus may be weak, therefore.  Others have 
argued that poverty measures are important indicators of the potentially threatening masses (see 
Piven and Cloward 1971 for a discussion of the effects of poverty on welfare spending).  Despite 
some disagreement in the empirical literature, our view is that there is enough evidence to merit 
inclusion of a labor surplus argument in an analysis of corrections spending. Moreover, the argument 
is clearly consistent with the logic of our politics of social order rubric.   
 Much previous research and theorizing suggests that formal social control also will vary with 
the relative proportion of the population that is a racial or ethnic minority (e.g. Blalock 1967; Liska 
1992; Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003).  From this view, increases in the size of minority 
population could represent a threat to majority interests, prompting punitive state action.  Moreover, 
some argue that where minority populations are small, relatively small increases in this population 
may be more likely to be perceived as “threatening” to the status quo than similar increases in areas 
with larger minority populations.  Once the minority group attains sufficient numerical strength to 
become a political force, increases in this population have much less impact (Jackson and Carroll 
1981).  Such a curvilinear relationship makes sense from the politics of social order perspective: 
State managers may respond to elite interests to maintain social order when minority populations are 
small.  However, when the minority population becomes larger the calculus of reelection would 
necessitate consideration of the potential swing vote of this bloc of voters. If minority voters are less 
inclined to desire increases in criminal punishment, then increases in correctional spending would be 
expected to flatten or decrease.  
 Some research reveals a positive relationship between the size of African American 
populations and punishment (Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Jacobs and 
Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and Helms 1999; Taggart and Winn 1991), whereas other research suggests 
the relationship is non-linear (e.g. Jackson and Carroll 1981; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005; 
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Liska 1992).  Research specifically focused on corrections spending reports that expenditures 
increase with increases in non-white population size, but it does not address potential curvilinear 
effects (Jacobs and Helms 1999).  Yet, research does not find consistent evidence that increases in 
other minority populations, such as Latinos, are associated with increases in state punitive reactions 
(cf. Greenberg and West 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001).   
Crime Control  
 Crime rates clearly are consequential for state officials’ decisions about corrections 
expenditures. From a politics of order perspective, state managers may consider rising crime rates as 
an indicator of declining social order and thus press for increases in criminal punishment.  Prior 
studies of correctional expenditures at the national level support this link (Caldeira 1983; Caldeira 
and Cowart 1980; Jacobs and Helms 1999).  Yet, research on state-level imprisonment rates reveals 
an inconsistent association between crime rates and incarceration rates (compare Beckett and 
Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001; Stucky, et al. 2005).  
 Despite the intuitive appeal of thinking that corrections expenditures naturally increase in 
response to increases in crime, the link may not be automatic.  Expecting increases in corrections 
spending as a result of increases in crime is consistent with a rational choice view of crime, where 
increasing funds for punishment translates into more punishment, thus deterring individuals from 
crime (see Jacobs and Carmichael 2001: 65).  But other models of crime causation focus less on 
individual choice and suggest that social conditions such as poverty or unemployment drive crime 
rates.  A government subscribing to this view might increase social welfare or education 
expenditures, rather than correctional spending, in an effort to ameliorate social problems and 
prevent future crime.6  It is by no means obvious, therefore, that there should be a direct positive 
6 This is especially plausible in light of recent research from the institutional anomie perspective 
which shows that generous welfare spending is negatively related to crime (see Hannon and 
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relationship between crime rates and correctional spending.  Yet, the intuitive appeal and the lack of 
clarity in existing research suggest that it is important to consider crime rates in an analysis of states’ 
corrections budgets.  
Fiscal Factors and Alternative Policy Priorities   
 Finally, from a practical standpoint, the ability of a state to pursue public policies depends on 
the availability of funds.  Greenberg and West (2001) note that better funded state governments are 
better able to satisfy a wider range of public demands, including more spending on corrections.  
Indeed, existing research on corrections spending has generally found that fiscal health plays a role 
(e.g. Jacobs and Helms 1999; Taggart and Winn 1991).   
 Perhaps more interestingly, states’ decisions about spending on social policies are not 
orthogonal.  Because state budgets are essentially a zero-sum game, when states spend more on 
corrections programs they are left with fewer funds for other programs, and vice versa.  Consistent 
with this, Lawrence (1995) notes that in the 1980s and early 1990s there was a general trend toward 
corrections spending and away from funding for education.  Such a trend is consistent with more 
conservative approaches to crime control noted above and would be expected as state officials shift 
spending from education to corrections in an attempt to respond to increasingly conservative 
electorates in recent years.  In addition, some scholars have argued that social control of marginal 
populations is accomplished formally by the corrections system and informally by the welfare system 
(e.g. Garland 1985; Inverarity and Grattet 1989; Piven and Cloward 1971).   Thus, the need for state 
punitive responses to potential threats to the social order is reduced when informal social control, 
such as welfare, is increased (see Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001).  This 
argument also is consistent with the politics of social order approach, which suggests that one of the 
basic goals of governments is to accomplish social control, albeit sometimes with the “carrot” of 
DeFronzo 1998; Maume and Lee 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Pratt and Godsey 2003; 
Savolainen 2000). 
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welfare spending and other times with the “stick” of corrections spending.  Because alternative 
policy priorities such as welfare or education may be seen as ways to strategically increase votes or 
maintain social control by state officials, a politics of order perspective suggests the importance of 
considering spending on welfare and education in any analysis of spending on correction.  
Summary 
 Although the U.S. prison boom has spurred recent research on imprisonment rates, few 
studies have examined a related outcome, spending on corrections.  One recent study by Jacobs 
and Helms (1999) found that partisan politics and racial threat influenced national-level trends in 
corrections expenditures.  But it does not address important variability at the state level.  Our 
study fills this gap in the literature.  In addition, we begin to push forward recent political and 
non-political explanations of punishment by tying them together under one rubric, which we 
label the politics of social order.  This rubric argues that criminal punishment is driven by the 
twin considerations of maintaining public order and the need for state officials to maintain power 
through popular election.  From this view, prior explanations of punishment such as partisan 
politics, citizen preferences, economic and racial threat, fiscal considerations, policy priorities, 
and crime, are important because they implicate strategies for maintaining social order, garnering 
votes, and maintaining political office.  
DATA 
To test the arguments above, we collected and analyzed annual state level data on 
correctional expenditures and the factors discussed above from 1980 through 1998.  These years 
were selected because U.S. corrections expenditures rose dramatically during this period, and it is the 
longest period for which all necessary variables were available annually at the state level.  The 
sample includes data on the 49 states with bipartisan political systems over 19 years, 1980 through 
1998.  Nebraska’s state legislature is non-partisan and unicameral and is therefore excluded.  
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Approximately 3% (27 / 950) of the sample was lost due to missing data on some variables in 
particular state-years.  Thus, the sample size is 923 state-years.   The following section briefly 
describes the variables that we include in our analysis.  Appendix A describes their sources.  
Corrections Spending 
 Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the proportion of total state expenditures 
devoted to corrections in each state-year.  Given that state spending is essentially a zero sum game, 
we examine corrections spending relative to the total budget – the piece of the expenditures pie 
devoted to corrections.7  This choice of dependent variable lends itself to a discussion of the impact 
of political considerations because it represents allocations to corrections versus other expenditures 
and thus conveys a sense of relative budgetary priorities.8  Prior studies of corrections spending have 
often modeled the rate of expenditures per capita. We show in Appendix B that our model predicting 
proportion of total state expenditures allocated to corrections can be re-expressed algebraically as a 
model predicting corrections spending per capita.  In a supplemental analysis, we estimate this 
alternative specification and obtain essentially identical results.  
Politics and Ideology 
 We include measures of both party power and competition in our model, consistent with the 
theoretical discussion above.  In terms of party power, we consider both the legislative and executive 
branches of state government (both of whom influence state budgets).  Specifically, Republican 
legislative percent is the percentage of state legislators in both houses of the legislature that are 
7 Some states have balanced budget requirements that are constitutionally mandated.  Although this 
may alter the total amount of spending in a state, this is unlikely to specifically influence the degree 
to which states choose to allocate spending for corrections as opposed to other types of expenditures.  
In other words, a balanced budget amendment would affect the size of the pie, not necessarily how it 
was sliced.  
8 Our dependent variable does not include expenditures for community corrections programs, which 
are primarily locally determined.  It is plausible that states vary in the extent to which their budgets 
are devoted to corrections based on differences in their reliance on community-based corrections 
programs.  Due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, investigation of this possibility is beyond 
the scope of the current project.     
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Republican in each state-year.  To measure Republican control of the state executive branch, we 
include Republican governor, a binary variable with a value of 1 in years where the governor was 
Republican and 0 otherwise.  We also capture the potential for the electoral cycle effects by including 
a binary measure with a value of 1 in gubernatorial election years and zero otherwise.   
 Our measure of district legislative competition follows the logic of Barrilleaux et al. (2002).  
This index is comprised of three key pieces of information from state legislative elections—margin 
of victory, safe seat percentage, and uncontested race percentage.  Margin of victory refers to the 
difference between the winner and loser’s vote share, averaged across all contested races.  The index 
also includes the percentage of ‘safe seats,’ which are those where the margin of victory was 20 
points or greater.  Finally, the index includes the percentage of possible races where candidates 
(usually incumbents) were unopposed at the polls.9   
 As noted previously, some would suggest that state policies simply reflect the ideological 
preferences of the state’s residents.  Researchers have argued that states characterized by liberal 
ideology among their citizens have lower imprisonment rates.  Following Jacobs and Carmichael 
(2001), we include in our model a measure of citizen political ideology originally developed by 
Berry and colleagues (1998).  This index is an unweighted average across all Congressional districts 
and accounts for the ideology of both incumbents and challengers.  The incumbent component is 
comprised of estimates of ideology for each member of Congress based on interest group ratings and 
weighted by the proportion of the electorate favoring them in their most recent election.  The 
challenger component assumes that the ideology of challengers is the average of all incumbents of 
the same party in the state, which is then weighted by the proportion of the electorate voting for them 
9 The index is 100 minus the simple average of the three components.  The index was computed 
separately for the upper and lower houses and then averaged to yield the final value for each state-
year.  Values were repeated from each election year until the next election year.  Because state 
legislative election information for 1990-1991 was unavailable, the midpoint between elections 
preceding and following this period were averaged for 1990 and then repeated in 1991.  Thus, the 
1990 and 1991 values were the simple average of the 1988 and 1992 election values in most states. 
 16 
                                                 
on election-day (see Berry et al. 1998: 330-31).10  Citizen ideology ranges from 0 for the most 
conservative to 100 in the most liberal state-years.   
 We also include a measure of black elected officials, which is the proportion of all officials 
that are African American divided by the proportion of the state population that is black.  This 
variable would be less than 1 if blacks are underrepresented in a state.  Values greater than one would 
suggest that African Americans are more likely to be elected than one would expect based on their 
percentage of the state population.   
Economic and Racial Threat Variables 
 We include several variables to assess the importance of economic and racial threat for 
understanding corrections spending.  First, we include a measure of percent employed, to capture the 
portion of the population that is connected to the legitimate labor market, and thus would be less 
likely to constitute a “threat” from a politics of social order perspective.  This measure is based on 
annual averages of monthly estimates from the Current Population Survey and includes all persons 
officially listed as employed divided by the civilian non-institutionalized population, multiplied by 
100. This measure addresses the chronic problem with unemployment figures – they do not include 
discouraged workers who have stopped looking for work.  We expect percent employed to be 
negatively associated with corrections spending. We also include the state’s poverty rate in our 
models, as an alternative measure of the economically marginalized population.   
 Consistent with past research on criminal punishment, we measure racial threat by including 
in our model percent Latino in the state (total number of Latino or Hispanic residents divided by the 
state population and multiplied by 100) and percent black in the state (total number of black residents 
10 The Berry et al. data are available through the ICPSR archive, study # 1208.  In supplemental 
analyses, we also assess an alternative measure of the political conservatism of the populace – a 
measure developed by Wright et al. (1985).  This measure uses pooled data from 51 CBS and New 
York Times citizen polls from 1974 to 1982 to create state-level ideology estimates.  
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divided by the state population and multiplied by 100).  We include the quadratic form of percent 
black in our analysis, consistent with our discussion above.  The percent Latino quadratic term was 
not associated with corrections spending; thus we include only the linear form in our reported 
analyses.  
Fiscal Variables  
 To capture the fiscal health of states, we include gross state product (GSP) measured in 
thousands of 1983 CPI adjusted dollars per capita.  To address spending on alternative social 
programs, we include public welfare expenditures measured as the natural log of the proportion of all 
state spending on welfare.11  We also include education expenditures measured as the natural log of 
the proportion of state spending on education programs.  We use the logarithm of these variables 
because it is of most interest to examine the effect of multiplicative changes in these monetary 
variables.  This allows us, for example, to assess changes in our outcome variable as a function of 
specified percent changes in public welfare expenditures.     
Crime Rates, Imprisonment Rates, and Demographic Control Variables 
 We measure state crime rates using data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.  Although 
the UCR is not without critics, we use these data for two reasons.  First, they offer the only existing 
measure of state-level reported crime that is readily available for the time period under study.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this is the data source that is most likely to inform policy 
makers in the state government about crime in their area.  Index crime includes rates of reported 
murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  We use the natural log 
of the number of UCR crimes known to the police per 100 persons for each state-year.    
 We also expect that states with higher rates of incarceration would devote a greater portion of 
their spending pie to corrections, and thus include state imprisonment rates in our model.  We also 
11 Note that is category broader than the traditional “welfare” programs such as AFDC/ TANF and 
refers to states’ larger social safety nets. 
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include the rate at which states release prisoners.   It is well known that many prisons tend to operate 
near or above capacity (see Harrison and Beck 2003, Table 8).12  Faced with this reality, state 
officials have two options—build more prisons or release more prisoners to make room for new 
arrivals.  New building and thus space is captured by increases in the imprisonment rates, whereas 
the annual rate of prisoner releases for each state captures the “back door” approach to relieving 
overcrowding.  Considering these factors allows us to control, albeit imperfectly, for states that are 
under court orders to reduce crowding.13  We also control for whether or not states are operating 
under presumptive sentencing guidelines in the years covered, which could potentially affect 
corrections spending.  States that implement presumptive sentencing policies may expect that these 
policies will influence the size of the prison population and alter spending accordingly (see Marvell 
1995; Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Sorensen and Stemen 2002).   
 Finally, we control for variation in corrections spending due to demographic and other 
factors.  It could be argued that larger urban states could be expected to devote more resources to 
formal social control because informal social control becomes more difficult with larger populations 
(Wirth 1938; see also Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990:925).  Therefore, we include a measure of state 
population, which is the number of state residents in millions.  One might also expect that the size of 
the state population in urban areas is related to spending on corrections.  Thus, we include a measure 
of metropolitan population, which is the percentage of the state’s population living in counties 
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau to be metropolitan.  Some have suggested that larger relative 
numbers of non-intact families could be associated with a loss of informal social control and lead to 
12 In supplementary analyses, we assessed whether a measure of operating capacity of states’ prisons 
was associated with corrections spending in our models.  There was no relationship. We do not 
include this variable in our reported model because missing data on this measure would substantially 
reduce the sample size.  
13 Unfortunately, direct measures of which state systems are under court orders to reduce crowding 
are unavailable for the nearly 20 years of our analysis.  In addition, Fliter (1996) and Taggart (1989b) 
suggest that court orders had limited effects on correctional spending.  
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increases in the use of formal social control such as the corrections system (Jacobs and Helms 1996).  
We therefore include a measure of marriage rates, which is the number of marriages per 1000 
persons.  We also include total expenditures, measured as the natural log of all state spending in 1983 
dollars, per capita.  It seems logical that the average level of spending on states’ citizens could be 
related to the piece of the budgetary pie spent on corrections.   
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 The dependent variable in our analysis is Yit , the logarithm of corrections spending as a 
fraction of total expenditures, for the ith state and tth year.  One advantage of modeling the log of the 
proportion, rather than the proportion, is that the distribution will be less skewed because the 
expected proportion is relatively small in most states (approximately .01-.06).  We model Yit as 
approximately normal with constant variance.  The homoskedasticity assumption is supported by an 
empirical investigation of residuals.14  To accommodate unobserved heterogeneity across states in 
corrections spending, we include in our model a state-specific intercept (i.e. fixed state effect) and a 
state-specific linear time trend (i.e. state-by-time interaction effect).  Sensitivity analyses indicated 
that including both state specific effects was necessary to account for state-to-state variability in 
corrections spending.    
 Because we use observations on each state for 19 consecutive years, we specify a model that 
accommodates series autocorrelation.  Specifically, we use a first-order autoregressive error structure 
over time within states.  Contemporaneous correlations (correlations within year, over states) are 
accommodated by including state-specific time trends in the mean structure.  Net of these time 
trends, the error terms from distinct states are assumed to be independent.   
 We use the first-lag value for most of our substantive covariates because we assume that 
spending in a given year is a product of the previous year’s politics, economics, demographics, and 
14 For example, there was no evidence of a relationship between residual variance and key variables, 
such as total expenditures.  A plot of residuals by predicted values exhibited no heteroskedasticity. 
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so on.  Contemporaneous measures of total state expenditures and the proportion of the total state 
budget going to welfare and education, respectively, are included because these variables reflect 
decisions made contemporaneously with decisions about correctional spending.  A second order lag 
is used for the district competition measure because legislators elected in one year do not take office 
until the following year.  Hence the influence of competition for their seat on state spending 
decisions logically would not have an impact on our outcome variable for two years.   
 This model can be cast as a special-case general linear mixed model (Frees 2004).  We fit the 
model using residual maximum likelihood (REML) in SAS PROC MIXED.  Our modeling approach 
borrows strength across states for estimating within-state effects and, hence, is relatively efficient.   
RESULTS  
 Our model predicts the observed outcome of proportion of states’ spending devoted to 
corrections reasonably well.  The correlation between predicted and observed corrections 
expenditures was about 0.96.  Of course, as is typical in this type of modeling, the state and time 
effects explain a large proportion of the variation in our outcome.  Yet, for predicting the proportion 
of spending on corrections, the substantive covariates explain about 26% of the variation that was 
unexplained by the model that included only state and time covariates.15  In addition, plots of the fit 
of models that include only state and time effects and exclude our substantive covariates (not shown) 
indicate that this reduced model does not track the data as closely as do our full models.   
 We conducted a thorough analysis of residuals, which supported our normality and constant-
variance assumptions.  Similarly, fitted value plots show no problems with lack of fit.  To assess 
15 We define total variation as ∑ −=
2)( yyT i  and unexplained variation as ∑ −=
2)ˆ( ii yyU .  Here, 
  ,ˆ, ii yy and  y   are observed, fitted, and overall average of log of admission rates; sums and averages 
are taken over all states and times.  The ratio U/T is the proportion of the total variation left 
unexplained.  If  UR and UF  are the unexplained variations for the reduced and full model then 
100(UR – UF)/UR  gives the percent reduction in unexplained variation when going from the reduced 
model with only state and time effects to the full model, which includes all of our other covariates.   
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potential multicollinearity, we computed variance inflation factors.  None of the VIFs exceeded 5, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in the model.   
 Table 1 gives the coefficient estimates and standard errors from our model predicting the 
proportion of states’ spending on corrections.  We find that the state-by-time interaction effect was 
significant at the p< .0001 level, the residual variance was estimated to be 0.024, and the AR(1)  
correlation was estimated to be 0.67 (both significant at the p < .0001 level).  The significant state-
by-time interaction means that there is evidence that the time trend in corrections spending varies 
across the states.  Table 2 gives estimates of the statistically significant effects, which are arguably 
more meaningful than the regression parameter estimates alone.  This table indicates the percentage 
change in correctional spending associated with specific unit increases (noted) in the independent 
variables.   
 Tables 1 and 2 show support for hypothesized relationship between Republican party control 
of state government and the proportion of spending devoted to corrections, net of other factors in the 
model.  Specifically, Republican strength in the state legislature is significantly associated with the 
portion of the spending pie going to corrections.  Table 2 shows that a standard deviation (10 
percentage point) increase in the percent of Republican legislators in the statehouse is associated with 
a statistically significant 1.74% increase in the proportion of total expenditures that go toward 
corrections.  Thus, these findings suggest that state legislative party strength is consequential for 
corrections spending.  This is an important finding because it extends state-level research on the 
importance of partisan politics to the context of correctional spending, and lends further weight to the 
argument that partisan politics is an important factor for understanding corrections in the United 
States.  Table 1 shows, however, that states with Republican governors are no more likely than other 
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states to increase the piece of the expenditures pie going to corrections.  We speculate about the 
difference in the effects of the executive and legislative branches in our conclusions.16   
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
In addition, we find evidence of a marginally significant association between party 
competition for legislative seats at the district level and corrections spending.  District level 
competition between the parties could lead to policy differences because of the concern that certain 
swing votes represent.  Thus, one might expect that more competitive state legislative races would 
lead to policies that are more in line with the preferences of poor and marginalized groups, because 
of the potential swing vote these groups could represent for either party.17  The evidence in Tables 1 
and 2 is consistent with this argument.  Table 2 shows that a one standard deviation unit increase in 
our district electoral competition measure is associated with a marginally significant 1.65% reduction 
in the proportion of the budget going to corrections.18  In other words, we find some indication that 
when legislators of either party face greater competition at the polls on average, a smaller share of 
the budget is spent on corrections, net of other factors.  This is consistent with the argument that 
politicians are mindful of the potential backlash among poor and minority voters, who tend to be 
opposed to increased corrections spending because they are disproportionately affected by such 
spending.    
There is no evidence, however, that there are electoral cycles in corrections spending at the 
state level, once the other variables in our model are controlled (see Table 1).  It could be that 
16 In supplemental analyses, we found that party of the President and presidential electoral cycles had 
no effect our state-level outcome.   
17 Because state spending research has historically focused on political competition in terms of the 
relative number of seats in the state legislature for each party, we examined whether measures of 
macro-level competition drove corrections spending in some supplementary analyses.  No evidence 
emerged to support the macro-level party competition model with respect to corrections spending.   
18 We also considered whether district competition might condition the influence of party politics, as 
Barrilleaux et al. (2002) suggest.  We found no such interactions here, which is consistent with 
Barrilleaux’s (1997) finding of a direct effect of district competition on state policy, but is 
inconsistent with research on prison admissions (Stucky, et al.  2005).  
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Caldeira’s (1983) findings are specific to the federal budgetary cycle or are related to the time period 
under investigation (1935-1975), which was well before the prison boom of the late 20th century.  
 Similarly, we do not find any evidence that a more liberal or conservative citizenry is 
associated with differences in corrections spending net of the other variables in our model.  In fact 
the association is quite close to zero.19  Although there is some evidence from other research that 
citizen ideology is associated with prison populations, our analysis shows that it is not statistically 
associated with corrections spending, net of partisan politics, fiscal considerations, and the other 
variables in our model.   
We do find some evidence that racial threat plays an important role in corrections spending.  
Specifically, we find that as the percentage of blacks in the state’s population increases, correctional 
spending increases, and then levels off (see Table 1).  To illustrate this quadratic effect, Table 2 
shows that for a state that is 0.5% black, a one standard deviation (0.4 percentage point) increase in 
percent black is associated with a statistically significant 18.32% increase in the fraction of the 
budget allocated to corrections spending.  For a state that is 15% black, a one standard deviation 
increase in percent black translates into a just statistically significant 5.9% increase in corrections 
spending.  Finally, for a state that is 25% black, a one standard deviation increase in percent black is 
associated with a statistically non-significant 1.9% decrease in the fraction of the budget allocated to 
corrections spending.  Together these effects show that states that have relatively small black 
populations have the largest increases in correctional spending when their black populations increase 
– even by a very small amount (here we used four tenths of a percentage point).  By contrast, states 
with the largest black populations see little change in their corrections spending when their black 
populations increase this small amount.  These results underscore the importance of racial threat for 
understanding formal legal control in the United States.  By contrast, we find that percent Latino and 
19 We also performed separate analyses using Wright et al.’s (1985) measure of citizen ideology, and 
found no evidence of an association with the proportion of state spending on corrections. 
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relative number of black elected officials in a state are not associated with corrections spending, net 
of the other factors in the model.20   
 We also find that percent employed and poverty rates are not significantly associated with 
corrections spending, net of the other variables in our model (see Table 1).  We note above that 
participation in the labor force, as measured by percent employed, may be a better measure of the 
extent of economically marginalized populations, because it is more sensitive to the absence from the 
labor market of discouraged workers and others who do not show up in unemployment figures.  
Nevertheless, we also assessed whether the percent of the state’s population who officially report 
being unemployed is associated with correctional spending in the context of our model.  This 
supplementary analysis similarly revealed a negligible association between percent unemployed and 
our outcome; the effects of other variables in our model remained very similar to those reported in 
Table 1.21   
Turning to the purely fiscal factors, we find a strong association between allocations of the 
budget to corrections and GSP.  Table 2 shows that a 10 percent increase in GSP is associated with a 
significant 5% increase in our outcome variable.  It appears that states devote a bigger piece of the 
pie to corrections as they become wealthier.  Perhaps as states become wealthier they become more 
conservative in ways not captured by our political and ideology variables, and thus become more 
likely to favor punitive responses to crime.  This interpretation is generally consistent with the spirit 
of a politics of social order perspective.   
20 One might expect interactions among the various forms of threat.  For instance, the effect of the 
presence of a minority population on corrections spending could be enhanced in times of high crime 
or high unemployment.  We found no evidence of such effects in a set of sensitivity analyses.  We 
also found no evidence of interactions between the threat variables and any other variables in the 
model.  We also did not find that the effect of black elected officials depended on percent black.  
21 We also examined whether income inequality (as measured by the Gini index) was associated with 
our outcome variable.  It was not. 
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The proportion of total state spending on welfare is strongly negatively related to the 
proportion of state spending on corrections.  Table 2 shows that a standard deviation unit increase in 
the proportion of state spending going to welfare translates into a significant 2.8% decrease in the 
share of spending going to corrections.  Although corrections-welfare tradeoffs have not been studied 
at the state-level, some research has reported tradeoffs between states’ welfare, education, highway, 
and health expenditures (Garand and Hendrick 1991).  Moreover, our finding of a negative 
association between welfare and corrections spending is consistent with arguments about the penal-
welfare complex, which propose that states must choose among a limited set of alternatives for 
controlling socially marginal populations (e.g. Garland 1985).    
We also find evidence of tradeoffs between education and corrections spending.  As the share 
of the budget spent on education increases, the share of the budget for corrections decreases (p = 
.033).  Table 2 shows that a 10 percent increase in education spending translates to a 2.1% reduction 
in the share of expenditures devoted to corrections.  Apparently, there are policy tradeoffs between 
educational and correctional expenditures, as well.   
There is no evidence, however, that crime rates, imprisonment admissions, and releases from 
prison are important for the proportion of the budget devoted to spending on corrections (see Table 
1).  This is the case even when crime and imprisonment rates are alternatively deleted from the 
model (i.e. when only crime or imprisonment is examined).22  In addition, sensitivity analyses 
showed that the null finding holds whether crime rates were represented as overall rates of index 
crime, property, or violent crime rates, and whether we included a first, second or third order lagged 
effect of crime rates.  These findings refute the notion that crime is the driving force behind changes 
in corrections spending and are more consistent with the arguments of Beckett (1997) and others that 
22 Based on Caldeira’s (1983) study of federal criminal justice expenditures, one might expect that 
the influence of crime would depend on the electoral cycles or partisan control of state government.  
Preliminary sensitivity analyses and found no evidence of such an effect.   
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the perception of crime or its use as a political issue is more important than the reality of crime.  In 
addition, Table 1 shows that state spending on corrections is unrelated to whether states are operating 
under presumptive sentencing guidelines.  This parallels some other research on the effects of 
determinate sentencing on correctional populations (e.g. Marvel and Moody 1995; Sorensen and 
Stemen 2002).  
We also find that the chunk of state spending going to corrections is unrelated to state 
population size, proportion metropolitan, or marriage rates.  Yet, total state spending per capita is 
significantly associated with our outcome – a standard deviation unit increase in the total budget per 
capita produces more than a 4.3% decrease in the share of the budget going to corrections (Table 2).  
So, states that spend more on their citizens devote less of the budget to corrections.  Perhaps states 
that are more generous focus less on punitive outcomes and more on remedying social problems.   
CONCLUSIONS  
Recent research on imprisonment rates in the United States has focused on the role of 
partisan politics. Yet, few studies have examined the aspect of corrections most directly under 
political control – corrections expenditures. The current study adds to the literature on trends in 
criminal punishment by analyzing annual state-level data on corrections expenditures across nineteen 
years, extending to the late 1990s.  In addition, we draw together insights from previous research on 
criminal punishment under the rubric of the “politics of social order” which highlights potential links 
between partisan politics, racial and economic threat, and state fiscal concerns. This framework is 
premised on the argument that state policies on punishment are based on the twin concerns of 
maintaining social order and maintaining power through democratic elections.  State theorists have 
long recognized that one of the major functions of states is to maintain social order, and punishment 
plays a key role in this endeavor.  Thus, state managers must always be concerned with maintaining 
social order and responding to perceived threats to social order.  Yet, democratically elected state 
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officials must also be concerned with obtaining and maintaining office by satisfying the voting 
public.   
This logic helps us to tie together previous findings and arguments in the literature under a 
single conceptual umbrella.  Specifically, partisan control and competition, citizen preferences, 
economic and racial threat, alternative policy priorities, and crime control, are linked because they 
have important consequences for social order or the maintenance of political office.  For example, 
partisan control of state government is consequential for correctional spending because Republican 
officials are likely to highlight crime as an election issue to garner votes from lower income voters 
who would otherwise be unlikely to subscribe to conservative political agendas.  Our results are 
consistent with this argument. We find that as the proportion of Republicans in the state legislature 
increases, so does the fraction of a states’ budget spent on corrections. Our results, however, 
highlight the importance of considering the effects of the legislative and executive branch separately, 
as we find that party of the governor does not affect corrections spending.  One explanation could lie 
in differences between the executive and the legislative branches in the nature of electoral politics.  
King (1989) argues that gubernatorial politics are more dependent on personality and incumbency, 
whereas partisanship drives legislative elections outcomes to a much greater degree.23   
Similarly – although not considered in previous studies of corrections expenditures and 
addressed in only one recent empirical study of imprisonment trends (Stucky, et al. 2005) – the 
politics of social order perspective suggests that party competition can lead politicians to enact 
policies to influence potential swing voters, especially when legislators face meaningful competition 
on election-day.  Consistent with this argument, we find that district level competition is marginally 
related (p =.058) to the proportion of expenditures devoted to corrections.  Thus, competition for 
23 Perhaps another explanation for the lack of a relationship between governor’s party and 
correctional expenditures lies in variation across states in the role that governors play in determining 
state budgets.  Some states allow governors line item veto power, whereas other states do not.  This 
would be an interesting issue for further research.    
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one’s seat on election day matters whereas competition in the form of a balance of seats in the 
assembly does not.  There may be practical reasons for the greater impact of micro-level competition 
effects.  On the one hand, real competition at the polls is likely to force one candidate to differentiate 
herself from challengers. On the other hand, a balance of power in the legislature may mean gridlock 
or more stochastic outcomes rather than consistent policy outcomes in either direction.     
We did not find that citizens’ liberal versus conservative ideological preferences affect 
corrections spending.  It may be, however, that the ideology of the electorate is captured by our 
partisan political variables because states with more conservative citizens tend to elect more 
Republican legislators.  Or, perhaps ideology operates through the fiscal variables we included in the 
analysis.  Our analyses show that states with larger gross state products devote larger shares of their 
budgets to corrections, which parallels the findings of some research on imprisonment trends.  
Perhaps richer states have more conservative electorates that favor more spending on corrections 
relative to other programs.  This is especially interesting because of the opposite effects of gross state 
product and welfare and education spending per capita.  Richer states had higher relative corrections 
expenditures but states that spent more money on their citizens, in terms of education and public 
welfare had lower state corrections expenditures.  Such a finding is consistent with arguments about 
the penal-welfare complex, which maintain that states achieve social control formally and informally.  
But, it is also consistent with the politics of social order perspective because it illustrates the calculus 
of electoral politics.  Savvy politicians in richer, more conservative states appear to increase 
expenditures for corrections consistent with the desires of likely voters and campaign contributors to 
increase reelection chances. Yet, states that spend more on average on their citizens likely have more 
liberal electorates and political officials therefore, are better served by favoring education and social 
welfare spending over correctional spending.   
Moreover, our findings show that the proportion of minorities in a state is associated fairly 
strongly with correctional spending and this effect is non-linear.  Increases to relatively small African 
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American populations are linked to more substantial increases in corrections spending, while 
increases to larger African American populations translate into much smaller changes in state 
budgetary commitments to  corrections.  This finding is consistent with research on racial threat and 
other criminal justice outcomes, including imprisonment rates, capital punishment rates, and police 
strength (e.g. Greenberg and West 2001; Jackson and Carroll 1981; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 
2005; Stucky 2005).  It also makes sense in terms of our thinking about the politics of social order.  
Growth in relatively small minority populations represents a threat to elite interests, translating into 
higher correctional expenditures, because politicians will attempt to allay the fears of elites.  By 
contrast, once the percent of African Americans in a state is substantial, they become a swing vote 
and politicians must now consider the preferences of this part of the electorate, as well.   
As with all research, our study has some limitations.  First, we do not measure variation in 
jail expenditures (see Duncombe and Straussman 1993, 1994).  Such data are not available annually 
for the state-years included in the current study.  Second, we are unable to capture the nuances of the 
ways that parties vary across the states.  Recent research suggests that variation in punishment across 
states is related to partisan differences but also differences in the degree of centralization of state 
power and the degree of citizen participation.  For example, Barker’s (2006) account of variation in 
punishment in three states relies on in-depth comparative historical analysis.  This work suggests that 
the influence of crime, racial threat and politics all dynamically interacted with the structure of the 
states.  Such work is beyond the scope of the current study empirically but is likely necessary to fully 
illuminate the operation of the politics of social order. 
In sum, our study contributes to the literature by directing attention to an important indicator 
of criminal punishment that has been overlooked by most research on the prison boom in the United 
States – the piece of the spending pie devoted to corrections by states.  Our finding of the importance 
of partisan politics for corrections budgets offers evidence in the continuing battle over the 
relationship between politics and public policy.  Some have recently suggested that partisan 
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differences in positions on law and order have declined over time (Beckett and Sasson 2000; 
Greenberg and West 2001).  Similarly, political scientists have long argued that the median voter 
model would suggest minimal distinctions between the parties in order to capture the most votes 
from the electorate which is bunched in the center on most issues (Downs 1957).   Yet, the current 
study suggests the continuing utility of considering partisan politics in relation to punishment 
policies, and public policies more generally.  Moreover, we push forward theorizing on the role of 
politics in punishment by explicating the underlying logic linking the effects of party politics, racial 
threat and state fiscal concerns.  Because punishment is an exercise of state power, explanations for 
variation in punishment are all filtered through the lens of state action, which are driven by the basic 
need for social order, but in modern democracies the calculus of electoral politics also appears to 
drive state policy.  
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Table 1.  Regression Parameter Estimates for Model of Proportion of State  
Expenditures on Corrections, 1980-1998 (N= 923).   
Variable Estimate Std.  Error   P-value 
Partisan Politics     
Republican Legislative Pct. .002 .001 .022 
Republican Governor .022 .015 .147 
Gubernatorial Election Year .004 .007 .557 
District Legislative  Competition  -.002 .001 .058 
Ideology    
Citizen Ideology -.001 .001 .449 
Social Threat    
Poverty Rate .002 .002 .293 
Percent Employed  -.007 .004 .122 
Percent Black  .434 .136 .002 
Percent Black Squared -.010 .004 .009 
Percent Latino -.073 .074 .327 
Black Elected Official Ratio    -.004 .176 .981 
Fiscal Health and Alternative 
Policy Priorities 
   
Gross State Product  .509 .125 .0001 
Public Welfare Expend Pct.   -.293 .056 <.0001 
Education Expenditure Pct. -.227 .106 .033 
Crime    
Index Crime Rate  -.003 .015 .869 
Controls    
State Population .105 .094 .264 
Metropolitan Population .004 .003 .140 
Total Expend per Capita -.462 .106 <.0001 
Marriage Rate .006 .004 .126 
Sentencing Guidelines -.012 .033 .715 
Imprisonment Rate -.204 .299 .496 
Prisoner Release Rate -.001 .001 .216 
Note: Fixed state effects estimates are suppressed.  The time effect is not reported  
because it varies significantly across the 49 states, as noted in the text.   
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Table 2.  Effect Estimates:  Percent Change in the Proportion of Expenditures Spent on 
Corrections Associated with a One Standard Deviation* Increase in the Effect Variable.   
    Estimate 95% Confidence Interval Test of Signif 
EFFECT   [increment] Percent Change Lower  Upper P-value 
Republican Legislative Pct.  [10] 1.74 0.25 3.25 .0222 
District Legis.  Competition [10] -1.65 -3.32 0.06 .0582 
Gross State Product [10%]* 4.95 2.54 7.42 .0001 
Public Welfare Expend Pct. [10%]* -2.75 -3.75 -1.73 <.0001 
Education Expenditure Pct. [10%]* -2.13 -4.04 -0.18 .0328 
Total Expend per Capita [10%]* -4.30 -6.17 -2.39 <.0001 
Percent Black**  [0.4]      
       …when percent black = 0.5% 18.32 6.69 31.20 .0015 
       …when percent black = 15% 5.90 0.42 11.67 .0349 
       …when percent black = 25% -1.90 -8.89 5.63 .6118 
 
*Increments around one within-state standard deviation were used for all the effects other than the four 
that are marked with asterisks.  For these log-transformed variables, we used an increment that 
corresponds to a 10% increase.    
 
**There is a quadratic effect of percent black. From the table we see that for a state that is 0.5% black, a 
0.4 percentage point increase in percent black is associated with an 18.32% increase [95% confidence 
interval:  6.69%, 31.20%] in the fraction of the budget allocated to corrections spending.  When a state 
is 25% black, a 0.4 percentage point increase in percent black is associated with a statistically non-
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 Appendix A: Variable Sources  
 
State Expenditures (corrections, total, public welfare, and education) 
Source: U.S.  Census Bureau’s State Government Finances (Series GF No.3).  Tables electronically 
retrieved for 1994-1999 (http://www.census.gov/govs/www/state.html). 
 
Republican Governor, Gubernatorial Election Years  
Source: The Book of the States.     
 
Percent of Legislature that is Republican   
Source: Originally collected by Carl Klarner, University of California, Davis and electronically 
available [www.unl.edu/SPPQ/journal_datasets/klarner_data/1959_2000Short.xls]. 
 
District Competition Index  
Source: Election data through 1989 originally collected by the ICPSR (Study # 8907), were updated 
by Mark A. Smith, University of Washington, who generously shared the data with us.  The 1992-
1996 data were computed from Barone, Michael, William Lilley, and Laurence J. DeFranco (1998) 
“State Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and Demographics” Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly.   
 
Citizen Ideology 
Source: ICPSR Study #1208: “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the United States” 
Principal Investigators: Berry, William D., Evan J. Rinqguist, Richard C. Fording, Russell L.Hanson.   
 
Black Elected Official Ratio 
Source: Unpublished data originally collected by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 
David Greenberg was kind enough to share the data with us. 
 
Crime Rates, Marriage Rates 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
 
Imprisonment Rates and Release Rates  
Source:  Correctional Populations in the United States (various years).  
 
Sentencing Guidelines  
Source:  Rottman, et al. (2000) State Court Organization 1998.  U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Table 48. Available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/  
 
Gross State Product  
Source: http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/current.htm 
 
Percent Employed  
Source: Unpublished data provided by the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
State Population, Percent Black, Percent Hispanic, Metropolitan Population, Poverty Rates  
Source: Data for 1977 to 1989 are unpublished data furnished by the U.S.  Census Bureau.  Data 
from 1990 onward were downloaded from website 
[http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/county/co_casrh.php]  “1990 to 1999 Annual Time Series of 
County Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin.”  
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Appendix B. Comparison of Proportion of the Budget to Spending Per Capita 
 
 As mentioned above, our model with dependent variable Y (the logarithm of corrections 
spending as a fraction of total expenditures) can be re-expressed as an equally reasonable model for 
the dependent variable Y*, the logarithm of corrections spending per capita.  The equivalence is 
relatively simple to see.  Let E, W, and C, represent education, welfare, and corrections expenditures.  
Let T be the total expenditures and let P be the population size.  In symbols, the dependent variable Y 
= log(C/T)  and the dependent variable Y* = log(C/P).  Our model for Y has the form Y = log(C/T) = 
a + b log(E/T) + c log(W/T) +d log(T/P) + [other effects and error], where a, b, c, and d are 
coefficients.   Adding and subtracting terms, we have that log(C/T) + log(T/P) = a + b [log(E/T) 
+log(T/P)] + c[log(W/T) + log(T/P)] + (d+1-b-c) log(T/P) + [other effects and error].  That is, Y* = 
log(C/P) = a + b log(E/P) + c log(W/P) + d’ log(T/P) +  [other effects and error].  Thus, our model 
for Y is equivalent to a model for Y*  that includes all the same covariates except that education and 
welfare spending are measured per capita rather than as a fraction of the total budget.  We fit this 
model for corrections spending per capita in 1983 dollars (Y*) using SAS PROC MIXED.  As 
expected, all effect coefficients, except total state expenditures, are numerically identical to those 
reported in Table 1.  This indicates that our findings are relevant for both the piece of the budgetary 
pie devoted to corrections as well as state spending on corrections per capita.   
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